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Abstract: By drawing upon recent research over the nature of a “rhetorical borderland,” we propose 
approaching it from a perspective of argumentative style, as a disputable space in cross-cultural 
argumentation where arguers run into encounters with a composite audience. We propose a 
three-dimensional agenda for a new understanding of “rhetorical borderland”: as a discursive construct 
in the mental horizon; as a conceptual notion with essential uncertainties; and as a disputable space in 
cross-cultural argumentation. For arguers in coping with this space, style is of no less importance than 
argument per se. There is no way for style to be separated from argument. Style is, in many cases, the 
very argument itself. 
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1. Introduction 
The way of arguing matters in social settings. From ancient to modern times, 
philosophers, rhetoricians, communication theorists, linguists, discourse theorists, 
pragmatists and the like have continuously offered their insights on this issue of style 
which is of crucial importance. Since ancient times, style has always been an 
important category in rhetorical studies. In the ancient Greek and Roman rhetorical 
thinking, style has already been categorized as an important component of rhetoric. 
For example, in the Rhetorical Handbooks compiled by sophists prior to Aristotle’s 
systematic theorizing in his Rhetoric, a rhetorical process covers “the three most 
important parts of classical rhetoric,” i.e. “invention”, “arrangement” and “style”  
(Kennedy 1994, p.6), or in the words of Paul Ricoeur, “rhetoric covered the three 
fields of argumentation, composition, and style” (1977, p.28). “Style” occupies the 
third place. This tradition extends to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, where the meaning of style 
(lexis) as the theme of Book III is two-fold: the way in which “thought is expressed in 
words, sentences and a speech as a whole” in a broad sense and simply “word choice, 
diction” in a restricted sense (Kennedy 2007, p.193). Also in the Ciceronian five 
canons of rhetoric, style secures its third position in the sequence of invention, 
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arrangement, disposition (style), memorization and delivery.  
What is worthy of special attention here, is Aristotle’s observation of the role of 
style in disposing the audience’s state of mind. The Aristotelian category of 
appropriateness (or propriety) and clarity is conceptualized in this way. This is also 
exactly Aristotle’s point of departure in his observations of style. For Aristotle, “The 
lexis [style] will be appropriate if it expresses emotion and character and is 
proportional to the subject matter.” For example, in the case of insolence, “emotion is 
expressed when the style is that of an angry man” (1408a [2007]). As is obviously 
shown in the above sequential orders, the legitimate location of style was canonized 
somewhere after “invention,” and “arrangement,” but before “memorization” and 
“delivery.” This refers to the transitory position of style in a rhetorical process, being 
neither part of the inventing or arranging process of rhetorical discourse, nor 
entrenched in the memorizing and delivering processes. 
This transitory or marginal status of style in ancient rhetorical thinking was 
rendered in such an unimportant way that it could miraculously survive the blitzkrieg 
campaigns from the philosophical tradition of anti-rhetoric, especially in the 
movements of Enlightenment and Humanism from the sixteenth to the nineteenth 
centuries, initiated by philosophical icons Rene Descartes, John Locke, Immanuel 
Kant, Peter Ramus and the like. Echoing Platonic downgrading of rhetoric, these 
philosophical intellectuals’ attacks dealt a coup de grace to rhetoric as a discipline. 
Invention, arrangement, memorization and delivery had to leave their rhetorical 
inhabitancies one after another against the background of the death of rhetoric as a 
discipline in the mid-19th century (Ricoeur 1977, pp.9-10), with style as the only 
surviving part that later developed into what is called “tropology” or studies on tropes 
and figures (pp.44-64). Later, these studies developed into a specialized field of 
research called stylistics which, in the words of Frans H. van Eemeren, is “the 
twentieth century successor of the rhetorical study of elocutio” (2019, p.154). 
Consequently, argues Ricoeur, “The reduction of all of these to the third part [style], 
and of that to a simple taxonomy of figures of speech, doubtless explains why rhetoric 
lost its link to logic and to philosophy itself, and why it became the erratic and futile 
discipline that died during the last century” (1977, p.28). This reduction of rhetoric to 
an “erratic” and “futile” discipline reflects the embarrassing situation for style. Here 
style is reduced to something of an ornamental nature without the nexus. This 
probably explains why style as a theoretical category receives inadequate treatment in 
Chaim Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s The New Rhetoric, and receives no attention 
at all in the influential Toulmin model proposed in The Uses of Argument. And as 
we’ve seen, in Robert J. Fogelin’s short piece on the logic of deep disagreement, it is 
only mentioned in passing by referring to “styles of acting and thinking” as part of a 
form of life. 
However, today we could possibly resist this taxonomical enterprise dating all the 
way back to ancient thinkers of rhetoric in at least two senses. For one thing, style is 
part of inventing persuasive discourse. For another, style is the arguer’s projection of 
the audience’s state of mind. In this sense, style is neither something ornamental to 
make argumentative discourse look good, beautiful or elegant. Nor is it something 
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instrumental in “trying to resolve a difference of opinion by convincing the intended 
audience or readership by means of argumentative discourse of the acceptability of 
the standpoint at issue” (van Eemeren 2019, p.154). But here, style is something of a 
fundamental importance in social settings in general and cross-culturally social 
settings in particular. Kenneth Burke in his A Rhetoric of Motives, provides a 
“simplest case of persuasion” by way of speaking: “You persuade a man only insofar as 
you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, 
identifying your ways with his. Persuasion by flattery is but a special case of persuasion in 
general” (1969, p.55). Burke is not talking about persuasion or identification in a 
cross-cultural context, but what he says here sheds some light on the importance of 
style in general. Clearly, style is an indispensable part of his art of identification. 
Flattery, as a familiar argumentation scheme in daily communication, is also a kind of 
style. It is a special style of disposing the audience in a state of mind in the arguer’s 
favor. Seen this way, style is probably of crucial importance in cross-cultural 
argumentation that abounds in deep disagreements. In cross-cultural social settings, 
arguers often run into encounter with each other, without necessarily knowing the 
other side in question. The absence of what is called a “community of minds” and the 
presence of what is called “incommensurability” are said to be cooperatively 
undercutting the possibility of cross-cultural argumentation (Liu 1999). 
But this also offers a good opportunity for us to rethink the nature of 
incommensurability and deep disagreement from the perspective of argumentative 
style. Aristotle was probably the first rhetorician to presuppose a “community of 
minds” for rhetorical argumentation. The observation was made by Barry Brummett 
in his A Rhetoric of Style: “Aristotle’s rhetoric ‘worked’ because he was writing about 
a tightly knit community of relatively homogeneous people in ancient Greece” (2008, 
p.xiii). This Aristotelian judgment was echoed about seventy years ago by Chaim 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca in their The New Rhetoric: “For all argumentation to 
exist, an effective community of minds must be realized at a given moment” (1969, 
p.14; emphasis added). Clearly, here they were presupposing the existence of a 
“community of minds” as a “condition of possibility for genuine argumentative 
interactions” (Liu 1999, p.297). In this line of reasoning, here acts of arguing refer to 
those of “using discourse to influence the intensity of an audience’s adherence to 
certain theses” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, p.14). Thus, there is an assumed 
“intellectual contact” whose “psychological and social conditions” render it possible 
for an audience to adhere intensely to those theses. Disagreement must be reached 
first on “the formation of this intellectual community,” and then on “the fact of 
debating a specific question together” (p.14). Even in the case of inward deliberation 
where “a person must conceive of himself as divided into at least two interlocutors, 
two parties engaging in deliberation,” this kind of inward “community” of selves is 
required. Therefore, to increase an audience’s adherence, at least two indispensable 
minima are involved in an argumentative act, i.e. “the existence of a common 
language, of a technique allowing communication to take place,” and a “contact of 
minds” which is guaranteed by one’s willingness to enter into discussion with some 
other particular beings (pp.14-17). 
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Similarly, ever since Thomas S. Kuhn’s coinage of the term “incommensurability of 
paradigm” in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in 1970, it has now been in 
wide circulation in the academic community of minds. Here paradigm refers to “a set 
tacit assumptions and beliefs within which research goes on” (Fish 1999, p.487). 
Though it was originally applied to academic fields, it has the potential to be 
applicable also in discussions of argumentation in public discourse and it has actually 
been so, especially in the field of cross-cultural argumentation. Kuhn ushered in the 
notion of incommensurability by uncovering the implicit change of fundamental 
assumptions in the paradigmatic shift of a science subject from a traditionally 
entrenched set of assumptions to scientifically revolutionary ones. Thus paradoxically 
in the same discipline, the logic of a new paradigm seems to be inconsistent with the 
logic of an old paradigm. Proponents of different paradigms seem to be using 
different parlances arising from different disciplinary belief systems. 
Not necessarily following Kuhn’s suit, Robert J. Fogelin offers his warning for 
informal logicians over the existence of deep disagreements in ordinary argumentative 
language whose inherent logic constitutes the hindering factor that tends to keep 
parties concerned from winning over the other side to one’s side. According to 
Fogelin, deep disagreements are generated by “a clash of framework propositions” or 
a conflict between them (1985, p.5). In his peculiar “logic of deep disagreements,” 
Fogelin argues that acts of arguing, i.e. those of “engaging in an argumentative 
exchange,” have a set of “shared commitments” as their presupposition. He goes on to 
argue that “an argument, or an argumentative exchange is normal” when and only 
when “it takes place within a context of broadly shared beliefs and preferences” (p.3). 
Should an argumentative context, albeit without being made clear what this context 
specifically means “beyond an engagement with ordinary language” (Tindale 2020, 
p.1), becomes “less normal,” “argument, to that extent, becomes impossible” (Fogelin 
1985, p.4). 
Obviously, these different perspectives have at least one thing in common, i.e. it is 
proposed that there must be an enabling precondition for all kinds of argumentation is 
purported to be a intellectual community, be it a “community of minds,” “an 
intellectual contact” or a shared belief system and referential preferences, etc. In these 
lines of reasoning, argumentation becomes impossible or unavailable or even 
unimaginable, once an incommensurability of referential system or an abnormal or 
less-normal context is encountered. In light of this reasoning, argumentation in a 
cross-cultural context, that is completely beyond consideration of the above 
argumentation theorists, and that abounds in cultural diversities, apparently “above 
the simplest level of complexity” (Fogelin, 1985, p.4), is doomed to failure without 
the arguer and the audience speaking a common language, to say the least and the 
context being of a normal nature. As for a possible way out, both Thomas Kuhn and 
Robert Fogelin explicitly proposed the pathway to persuasion in cases where rational 
reasoning does not work. Fogelin at the end of his short piece unveils the true color of 
deep disagreements by referring to their recalcitrance to adjudication and resistance 
against subjection to rational resolution in such a way that we have to “fall back on 
persuasion” (p.7). However, he not only demonstrates his optimism by pointing out 
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that interlocutors concerned try to “surface the background propositions” for a direct 
discussion (p.5), but also implies his pessimism expressed in the prospects for 
resolving deep disagreements (p.7). 
This pessimism could be found in his judgment that the source of deep 
disagreement arises not from “isolated propositions,” but from “a whole system of 
mutually supporting propositions (and paradigms, models, styles of acting and 
thinking) that constitute…a form of life” (pp.5-6). It is implied here that should 
nothing takes place to this form of life, there could be little possibility for a deep 
disagreement of any kind to be solved. Here apparently is the implication that the 
origin of deep disagreement could be traced all the way back to the cultural diversities 
in which a special style of being in the world, including styles of thinking, speaking, 
writing, and doing things are forged, encouraged, implied or even imposed. It is 
precisely here, we argue, that the style of arguing as part of a living style could play 
its deserving role in the resolution of deep disagreements in a cross-cultural context in 
the two proposed senses: style of arguing cross-culturally as the face of an arguer, and 
style as the pathway to persuasion. 
Here in the pathway to persuasion, the nongeographical space in the mental horizon 
where deep disagreements are located seems to be a labyrinth for arguers. What the 
arguer could do is to get the permit into this labyrinth in the first place. With the 
permit in hand, the arguer could manage to enter into the space, map out a workable 
routine, figure out the structure that underpins disagreements, get out old ideas and 
move in new ones to let them inhabit there. In this sense, style looks like the “face” of 
an argument and meanings read into this face carry far more significances than 
traditionally assumed. In the discussions to follow, we’ll address three kinds of 
tension, i.e. that between a local style and a universal (global) style, that between an 
aggressive style and an honest style, and that between an offensive style and an 
assertive style, to illustrate the often-assumed-unimportance or 
taken-for-granted-marginality of the role played by style in cross-cultural 
argumentation. 
 
2. Local vs. Global Style: From “rhetorical borderland” to disputable space 
Style is more often than not assumed to be deeply rooted in a cultural tradition. In this 
sense, every style abounds in its local and cultural characteristics. In The New 
Rhetoric, Chaim Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca point out that “to each social 
structure there correspond particular modes of expressing social communion” (1969, 
p.164). For example, there is “the style of democratic societies” and “the style of 
hierarchic societies” (p.164). To put it in a different way, style is always spatially and 
temporally conditioned. More importantly, style is highly audience-specific in both 
intracultural and intercultural senses. Here there is always the tension between a local 
style which applies to a particular audience and a global style which applies to a 
universal audience. No wonder argumentation in a cross-cultural context comes 
across a conflict of styles. For example, the Chinese cultural pursuit of social 
“stability” and “harmony” was held accountable by missionaries and sinologists from 
ancient to modern times for the juxtaposition of Chinese indirectness versus Western 
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(more accurately North American) directness (Mao 2005, p.444). In this axiomatic 
juxtaposition with the latter being superior to the former, the Chinese indirection is 
pitted over against the Western directness. Regrettably, this comes at the price of 
Chinese indirection being feminized. However, argues Mao, this kind of juxtaposition 
or comparison resulting from what he calls “Oriental logic,” “however 
well-intentioned, inevitably runs the risk of overgeneralizing each communicative 
style and of decontextualizing its own internal complexities” (2005, p.446).  
Therefore, to better adapt to a local audience in a context, the appropriateness of 
style is anticipated, invented and projected from context to context. The acceptability 
or appropriateness of one style in one place does not necessarily guarantee its same 
acceptability or appropriateness in another place, in another context and for a different 
audience. For deep disagreements that are subtle and invisible, style is of utmost 
importance. Deep disagreements are firmly entrenched or structured within walls of 
mind marking very tricky territories or spaces that are invisible in the rearview mirror. 
These territories or spaces are historically, culturally and discursively informed, and 
these walls are rhetorically constructed. They are territories or spaces in a metaphoric 
sense, but not in a literal or physical sense. Thus the change of “reality” in these 
territories or spaces, to draw upon Lloyd Bitzer, could only be possible “not by the 
direct application of energy to objects, but by the creation of discourse which changes 
reality through the mediation of thought and action” (1968, p.4). It is precisely here, 
we argue, that style can be a good mediator especially in a cross-cultural context. This 
also raises the question about the nature of these territories or spaces. Are they 
disputable spaces? Could we move through them? And in what ways could this be 
possible? Is style an important tool? To Fogelin, on grounds that these “disagreement” 
spaces are so deeply entrenched in the mental horizon that they are irresolvable 
“through the use of argument” (1985, p.5), the answers are probably negative. 
However, this is definitely not the true “color” of deep disagreement. Deep 
disagreement is a social intellectual entity with its premise and conclusion. If the 
warrant is unpacked or loosened, the assumed connection between the premise and 
conclusion no longer holds or will be called into question. In this sense, deep 
disagreement is not a self-contained entity, as is the case with Robert J. Fogelin. This 
entity could have its cultural, political, ideological, and intellectual dimensions. Or it 
might simply be a biased or prejudiced opinion. Besides, deep disagreements are not 
necessarily adversary arguments. Some deep disagreements arise from beliefs, while 
others arise from commitments. In the former case, they are adversarial, while in the 
latter case, they are not adversarial (Casey 2020). Undeniably, theories of deep 
disagreements have strong interpretative power within an intellectual community, to 
say the least. Could what James Crosswhite called “deep rhetoric” be a panacea for 
deep disagreement? From The Rhetoric of Reason to Deep Rhetoric, James 
Crosswhite proposes a deep “rapprochement of rhetoric and philosophy” (2013, p.28). 
Here a deep rhetoric, argues Crosswhite, is a “philosophical rhetoric that will not 
simply be in conflict with disciplinary conceptions of rhetoric but will instead help to 
interpret and explain and to some extent even justify and strengthen them” (p.28). 
This is, apparently, an inheritance of Platonic conceptions of rhetoric in his dialogue 
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Phaedrus. In this sense, “Rhetoric is a way of being human, a way of educating 
human beings, a way of nonviolence, a way of reason and freedom, a political way . . . 
and more” (p.29). For our purpose here, the interesting point is rhetoric as ways of 
being human, performing, acting, thinking and doing things. However, to my 
understanding, deep rhetoric makes two senses. For one, it refers to the concealment 
of rhetoric. Deep rhetoric here is in itself subtle, invisible and self-concealing in the 
sense that “rhetoric can succeed only when it can conceal its methods” (Hansen 2008, 
p.4270). For another, it means a reasonable way of presenting arguments, which paves 
the way for getting at the truth in a philosophical sense. In a word, deep rhetoric refers 
to the kind of rhetoric that does not expose its own rhetoricity or covers up its 
rhetorical craftiness in such a way that its rhetorical nature is not easily recognizable. 
This is, essentially speaking, the presentation of a neutral style in persuasive discourse. 
For example, “When one is trying to advance new and shocking value judgments,” 
Chaim Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca argue in The New Rhetoric, “these are more 
readily admitted when the style employed is not shocking” (1969, p.152). 
Then, one may ask, will a “shared rhetorical tradition” be an answer to the 
question of deep disagreement? Or will what Barry Brummett calls “social system 
that we all have in common” be workable? His point is that “despite the enormous 
diversity and fragmentation in today’s world, style is what knits the world into a 
relatively homogeneous system of communication” (2008, p.xiii). Brummett is in 
denial that “a rhetoric of style completely replaces earlier rhetorics, such as, those of 
Aristotle, George Campbell, or Kenneth Burke, which still find broad relevance” 
(p.xii). But his proposal for a global rhetoric of style is obvious in two senses. For one, 
“style is in some important ways the name for a system of persuasive signs and 
meanings into which nearly everybody, globally, has entered” (p.xii). For another, 
“there is also style, an increasingly global terrain of shared knowledge, action, and 
judgment” (p.xiii). For example, in the making of Chinese American Rhetoric as a 
new form of rhetoric, a style of “togetherness-in-difference” is proposed by LuMing 
Mao in addressing what he calls “rhetorical borderland”. What Mao calls “rhetorical 
borderlands” here, is a notion he develops from what Mary Louis Pratt called “contact 
zones,” by which Pratt meant “social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple 
with each other, often in contexts of asymmetrical relations of power” (Mao 2005, 
p.432). In contact zones, new forms of expressions are generated, one of which is 
what is called “autoethnographic” style. This new style enables people “to describe 
themselves in ways that engage with representations others have made of them” 
(p.432). Chinese American Rhetoric, which “both selects and invents from Chinese 
rhetorical tradition and European American rhetorical tradition,” develops into a new 
form of persuasive discourse where ways of expression “may blur boundaries” and 
even “may disrupt asymmetrical relations of power” between the two traditions 
(p.432). However, as Yameng Liu (1999, p.297) rightly questions in another context 
on the possibility of cross-cultural argumentation, is there such a “shared rhetorical 
tradition” which we could “fall back on as the ultimate guarantee for agreement”? 
What is the definition of “tradition” in a postmodernist era? Is there a tradition “out 
there” for arbitrary selection and invention? Is not tradition a result of selection and 
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invention in itself? So on and so forth. Chinese American rhetoric remains ambiguous 
and controversial as a term in itself. We argue that a better alternative for “rhetorical 
borderlands” would probably be “disputed spaces” that abound in deep disagreements. 
As Christopher W. Tindale argues, “The argumentative situation is a nongeographical 
space, located in and created by discourse. We inhabit such spaces with different 
facility, some of us with ease, others with discomfort. Yet they are crucial to our 
self-understanding and our understanding of others. Exploring these spaces, then, 
should be a priority and not an incidental by-product of an otherwise specialized 
education” (Tindale 2004, p.3; emphasis added). This disputed space or 
nongeographical space is marked by walls of mind in the audience’s mental horizon. 
In the discussions to follow, we will use a few cases in which Chinese individuals 
engage with their Western interlocutors to illustrate the role(s) style plays in 
cross-cultural argumentation. 
 
3. Aggressive vs. Honest Style: Revisiting the Trish vs. Xin Debate 
The way in which China engages the West matters, especially when the Chinese style 
is frequently accused of being too “assertive” or even “aggressive.” In current fields 
of cross-cultural argumentation, there are many disputable or nongeographical spaces 
of this kind. For example, there are disputed spaces ranging from bilateral trade, 
human rights, intellectual property rights, Taiwan, South China Sea to climate change 
between the U.S. and China. On the one hand, the geopolitical and ideological 
frameworks indeed condition individuals’ understanding and interpretation of the 
nature of these spaces. There seems to be not much room for dispute. On the other 
hand, individuals can contribute to dialogues or conversations between parties 
concerned in managing these spaces to make them into consubstantial spaces. This 
means that consubstantial spaces can operate as the common ground for departure 
rather than as the dividing line for departure. This idea is derived from Kenneth 
Burke’s discussion of identification and consubstantiality in his A Rhetoric of 
Motives:  
 
A is not identical with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A 
is identified with B. Or he may identify himself with B even when their interests 
are not, if he assumes that they are, or is persuaded to believe so…In being 
identified with B, A is “substantially one” with a person other than himself. Yet at 
the same time he remains unique, an individual locus of motives. Thus he is both 
joined and separate, at once a distinct substance and consubstantial with another 
(1969, pp.20-21). 
 
Here, argues Burke, “two persons may be identified in terms of some principle they 
share in common” (p.21). By drawing upon Burke’s theory of identification and 
consubstantiality here, disputed or nongeographical space is essentially a (deep) 
principle in the audience’s mental horizon. An arguer can manage to project a second 
self to make it consubstantial with her audience to redefine the nature of the 
nongeographical space. In this sense, nongeographical space is not a point of deep 
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disagreement, but a joint point of departure. 
A recent case in point is the Trish vs. Xin debate which had “sparked widespread 
attention from media across the world.”1 On May 29, 2019, Ms. Liu Xin, Chinese 
CGTN anchor for the talk show “To the Point,”2 joined Ms. Trish Regan, Fox 
Business Network host on her “Primetime” show for a live television discussion on 
China-U.S. trade issues.3 This event did not come all of a sudden. But actually it was 
the latest development of a series of verbal exchanges either on social media or on 
their talk shows against the background of increasing U.S.-China trade disputes. All 
this was dated back to Trish Regan’s argument in her talk show two weeks before, in 
which she accused the Chinese people and Chinese companies of stealing $600 billion 
worth of U.S. technology. Then Liu Xin filed back her rebuttal in her show that 
Regan’s argument was “all emotion” and “little substance.” After this, both sides 
“exchanged more salvos on-air,” “traded tweets,” and then a debate was set for them 
to face off on May 29. (Shih 2019) However, the much-anticipated “debate” turned 
out to be a Q&A session between the two TV anchors. In this 16-minutes-long event, 
their discussion covered subjects ranging from trade talk to intellectual property theft, 
from technology transfer to China’s developing nation status at the WTO, from tariffs 
to state capitalism. All together, Regan raised six questions, and Liu responded to 
each of the questions in an “honest” way. This analysis is not meant to be a 
reconstruction and evaluation of the debate-qua-discussion to declare the winner or 
loser, but is meant to be a deconstruction of the “honesty” style, and to distance itself 
from most of the currently available post-debate commentaries, home and abroad. We 
don’t adopt the winner vs. loser approach. Rather we look specifically at how two 
different argumentative styles had worked out in the exchange of arguments, and what 
this might have meant for the audiences on both sides. 
  The post-debate controversy is centered around the “honesty vs. aggressive” style 
rather than the content of the discussion. On this account, no matter how successful 
Liu’s efforts were in helping clarify the position of the Chinese side regarding the 
ongoing trade disputes between the U.S. and China, the honesty or politeness style 
adopted by Liu Xin is said to undercut the perlocutionary effect of the discussion, 
especially when it was put in stark contrast to the aggressiveness style employed by 
Trish Regan. Among the signs on the basis of which Liu was accused of being too 
polite in the discussion was the fact that she was unable to raise any question for her 
interlocutor. At this point, Liu was characterized as a passive participant of discussion 
or outsider-as-guest with Trish Regan playing host in her homeland as an 
aggressor-like inquirer into the shared discursive space between CGTV and Fox 
Business Network in a narrow sense, or China and the U.S. in a broad sense. It is 
precisely here that the honesty or politeness style is pitted against the aggressiveness 
style.  
 
1 “Liu Xin looks back at her debate with Trish Regan,” available at: 
(https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d674d7a6b544f34457a6333566d54/index.html) 
2 CGTN, an acronym for China Global Television Network, is the international division of China Central 
Television (CCTV). 
3 A full transcript of the live discussion is available at this website: 
https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d774d3245444d35457a6333566d54/index.html. 
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Apparently, there is an implicit binary opposition in this rendering, with the latter 
style being prioritized over the former one. No matter whether it is the honesty style 
or the assertiveness style, the style of argumentation is correlated with the arguer’s 
ethos, which, according to Aristotle, is the “most authoritative form of persuasion” in 
relation to logos and pathos (1356a[2007]). Therefore, the first consideration for 
every arguer, is the projection of an ethos which helps build up the arguer’s credibility. 
In terms of place, ethotic arguments involve the physical and nonphysical dimensions 
(Wang 2020), and in terms of Kairos, there is also the timing dimension. In this debate, 
for Liu, place here refers to her identity as an anchor with CGTN, grown up in the 
Chinese rhetorical tradition that attaches great importance to rhetorical or discursive 
honesty as a basic principle. Should an arguer’s words sound dishonest, there is little 
credence for the arguer’s character. Whatever Liu says must also be in accord with her 
identity. Otherwise, her words will not be trustworthy or honest. Kairos, as a principle 
of rhetorical timing since ancient Greece, demands that an arguer says the right thing 
at the right time for the right audience. For the Fox audience, they wanted to learn 
through Liu’s words, how the Chinese side sees the current trade disputes between the 
two countries and what the Chinese version of solution is. For Liu’s domestic 
audiences in China, where the debate was “eagerly anticipated” and where 
“nationalism and distaste for the United States are running high,” she was expected to 
play tough, and most importantly, her discourse was produced to change or challenge 
as much as possible the American audience’s received perception of the China-U.S. 
trade deadlock. This, in large measure, hinges upon what sort of ethos she has 
projected in American audiences’ minds and in what ways she has engaged her 
discursive partner, for that matter, and more importantly, what sort of ethos her 
American audiences have conceived of her and her country. 
It is precisely here that the tension between (de)individualizing efforts and 
(de)institutionalizing efforts came into being. In a news story delivered one day 
before the debate took place, the focus was on the character of the two female anchors. 
For Trish Regan, between the lines, the different versions of her character are: “a star 
of one of President Trump’s favorite television networks, Fox Business,” and an 
anchorwoman who “isn’t exactly known for her adversarial stance toward the Trump 
administration.” There is inconsistency between Trish A as a star of pro-Trump TV 
Network and Trish B as an adversary of the Trump administration. Could it be 
possible that Trish A was from the same Television network that happened to be one 
of President Trump’s favorites while Trish B was depicted as a well-known (but 
without being exactly so)  critic of the Trump administration? As far as her stance 
toward the U.S.-China trade disputes was concerned, the implicitly fundamental 
assumptions (on tariffs, state capitalism, IP theft, etc.) were similar to the stance 
explicitly expressed by the former White House chief strategist Stephen K. Bannon in 
his widely circulated newspaper article. In this article, Steve put forward his six 
theories of understanding China that cover China Threat, state capitalism, economic 
development model, tariff policy, IP theft, and totalitarianism (Bannon 2019).4 In 
 
4 Bannon’s theories were refuted as “US far-right nationalist” thinking by China’s Global Times in an editorial. 
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both Trish A and Trish B, there seemed to be a shadowed Stephen K. Bannon. But 
unlike Stephen K. Bannon characterized here as a US “ultra right-wing opinion 
leader,”5 Trish Regan was hardly mentioned in the Chinese media before the event. 
Actually, she was hardly known until Liu Xin directly took aim at her by criticizing  
her poorly supported overgeneralizations. But after the event was announced, there 
was some coverage of her profile and background. Basically, she was portrayed as a 
pro-Trump figure. 
However, for Liu Xin, there are many selves uncovered one by one here: a 
polished debater, CGTN anchor, “one of China’s best known faces,” “a symbol of 
Chinese toughness and rationality,” one of Chinese state media reporters who are 
“getting bigger and bolder,” “a woman who is unapologetic about championing 
China,” “an English major from eastern China who speaks flawless English, some 
French, German and Turkish,” “the first Chinese student to win an international public 
speaking competition in London in 1996,” “one of [CCTV’s] highest-profile 
correspondents, covering events like President Barack Obama’s state visit to Beijing, 
the Iran nuclear talks and the conflict in Syria,” the current wife of “a German man of 
Turkish descent,” a mother of several children, an experienced “China Story” teller 
inside and outside home in the past ten years, a reasonable anchor who cares about the 
foreign audience, a journalist who frequently urges her Chinese peers to be “more 
assertive and self-confident,” a vehement critic of Western media, a strong believer in 
the “validity and rationality of [China’s] development path,” an employee with CCTV 
whose U.S. division was ordered by the Justice Department of the U.S. “to register as 
an agent of foreign influence,” possibly one among “some CCTV correspondents 
[who] have embraced overt displays of nationalism,” a colleague of some nationalistic 
correspondents, a CCTV reporter who was complicit in the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry’s censorship and punishment of BBC’s “inappropriate” and “unfair” 
coverage of the 19th Chinese Communist Party National Congress by suspending the 
British broadcaster’s visa renewals. (Shih 2019) These unprecedented layer-after-layer 
peelings of Liu Xin’s selves were conducted in such an astonishing way that the 
remaining innermost self of Liu Xin could not be anything but a spokesperson of the 
Chinese Communist Party. For us, we reject the essentialist belief that for every 
human being, there is an innermost self “out there” in the bottom of the human mind, 
and that the other selves is just an extension of this innermost self into different 
contexts. 
This kind of essentialist approach is consequential discursively, often detrimental 
to the ethos of an arguer. The discursive reality constructed out of these many selves 
of Liu Xin provided an opportunity for the American audience to locate or relocate 
Liu’s position and Regan’s as well in the disputed space between Fox Business 
Network and CGTN. Unfortunately, in return, this positional judgment worked as a 
vintage point or rationality from where Liu’s and Regan’s discursive behaviors would 
be judged. The above in-depth exposure of Liu’s multi-dimensional identities had left 
 
But in both the argument and counterargument, argumentum ad hominem is rampant. See “Bannon confronts 
China with fringe theories,” which is available here: (https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1150055.shtml.) 
5 “Bannon promotes economic fascism.” (https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1151277.shtml) 
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little room for Liu’s self-denial of being a communist party member upon such a 
claim by Trish Regan in the opening remarks. Anything said against this rationality or 
being not something radiating from this vantage point could be rendered as irrational 
or unreasonable. In sum, this rationality had become the defining characteristic of the 
newly constructed reality. Now this rationality extended into Trish Regan’s opening 
remarks: 
 
...She’s the host of a primetime English language television programme 
overseen by the CCP, the Chinese Communist Party…As these trade 
negotiations stall out, it’s helpful to know how the Chinese communist party is 
thinking about trade and about the United States. In the interests of transparency, 
I should explain that I don’t speak for anyone but myself as the host of a Fox 
Business show. My guest however is part of the CCP and that’s fine… (See 
“Full transcript of Liu Xin’s live discussion on Fox”; emphasis added)6 
 
Here clearly a kind of intertextuality is formulated between Trish Regan’s remarks 
and the U.S. media’s coverage of this big event between the two countries at a 
particular time. This meant that Regan’s location of Liu’s identity was authorized by 
the rationality established in the audience’s mind. Here’s Liu’s response to Regan’s 
remarks: 
 
I have to get it straight, I am not a member of the Communist Party of China 
(CPC), this is on the record. So please don’t assume that I’m a member, and I 
don’t speak for the Communist Party of China, here today I’m only speaking for 
myself, as Liu Xin, a journalist working for CGTN. (Note: from the same source 
as the preceding one) 
 
Seen from the perspective of discursive authorization, Liu Xin’s counterstatement 
following Regan’s statement here paled in comparison to the well-established 
rationality. Worse, Liu’s counterargument here would most probably be judged as 
dishonest since it was not only against the rationality but also against the 
commonsense. This commonsense was that the so-called “objectivity” or 
“transparency” claimed by Chinese media that were overseen by CCP could never be 
“objective” and “transparent.” By contrast, Trish Regan stated that she was not 
speaking for anybody but herself, and that it had been a tradition of her show to 
“welcome different perspectives.” Therefore, on the one hand, under the umbrella 
word “transparency,” whatever word Trish Regan uttered would be authorized and 
protected by the principle of transparency. On the other hand, this very attitude toward 
transparency of hers was in itself an honest enactment of the very spirit of journalism: 
“And though she and I may not agree on everything, I believe this is actually a really 
unique opportunity, an opportunity to hear a very different view.” 
Also in the opening remarks of both sides, there is the tensions between 
 
6 https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d774d3245444d35457a6333566d54/index.html. 
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institutionalization in the case of Liu and de(institutionalization) in the case of Regan, 
and also between individualization and de(individualization) in both cases. This 
surely involved the principle of essentialism, and often in the argumentation scheme 
of ad hominem argumentum. But of course this argumentation scheme is not 
unfamiliar in both sides’ public discourse, to be fair. Such an essentialist approach 
adopted in the anatomy of Liu Xin’s historical and current ethos could only serve to 
render in advance of the event every word Liu would utter in the debate the next day 
as sensational communist propaganda and totally dishonest and unacceptable to the 
American audience. The reason was simple: the audience’s cognitive environment had 
been completely changed and a discursive reality was successfully constructed which 
was in Regan’s favor, but to Liu’s disadvantage. 
The above-discussed widely-circulated ethos of “assertiveness” for Chinese 
state-run Media Networks and their journalists as a whole must have conditioned Liu 
Xin’s way of expressing opinions in the debate on Fox. This could be counted as the 
latest evidence for the collectively “getting bigger and bolder” ethos of Chinese 
journalism, which was provided in a news story predicting this event. Here in this 
preview, in contrast to the seemingly “neutral stance” suggested in the title “Anchors 
from China’s state TV and Fox are facing off,” the collective ethos of Chinese 
journalism became unfortunately the new “rationality” or “reasonableness” in the 
audience’s mental horizon. This was basically the context that constrained Liu’s way 
of self-presentation in the debate. In such a rhetorical situation, the only available 
choice of presenting her arguments was the style of being polite, honest and 
reasonable. Otherwise, in the words of Yuan Zeng, a lecturer from School of Media 
and Communication at the University of Leeds, such events as Liu’s debate could 
only serve to “offer more proof to the network’s [CCTV’s] critics” (Shih 2019). 
Therefore, the style of being polite, honest and reasonable could be a result of Liu 
Xin’s careful and thoughtful calculation and design in her preparation for this debate, 
rather than a natural overflow of her being inherently honest. To draw upon Hannah 
Arendt, these other selves are not of “a permanent fixture annexed to the inner self.” 
What Arendt denies here is the existence of such an innermost self that represents the 
voice of conscience that will speak to the other selves to monitor their behaviors 
(2003, p.13). 
 
4. In pursuit of the “honesty-qua-assertiveness” style 
However, the nonexistence of an innermost self does not rule out the possibility of 
sounding this way from occasion to occasion, from time to time, from context to 
context, and most importantly from audience to audience. In the case of Liu Xin as a 
journalist, this is also required by her professionalism. If an audience believes in Liu 
Xin as a journalist, whatever she says from her studio or newsroom will sound 
trustworthy or believable, or vice versa. Seen this way, the honesty style is inherent in 
the professionalism’s requirement. All this involves the establishment of an honest 
ethos. According to Aristotle, this ethos (character) has nothing to do with an arguer’s 
human records and social reputation, but is established through one’s discourse. This 
means that an arguer’s discursive credibility plays a crucial role in the process, and 
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once this credibility is established in the first place, an intended ethos manifests itself 
in the audience’s mental horizon. In this sense, in the case of Liu Xin, a particular 
ethos is highly important but was unfortunately downplayed or neglected in the 
afore-mentioned media coverage. This is her ethos of multiculturalism. 
We could hardly imagine now how Liu Xin could have been a “flawless” English 
speaker and could have decided to marry a German gentleman and could have 
demonstrated her outstanding multilingual abilities in French, German and Turkish, if 
she would not have been an enthusiastic lover of Western languages and cultures, at 
least English and German cultures. And if she would not have cherished this 
multicultural ethos so strongly to boost up her international reputation and perhaps 
more importantly to hold her international family together, where could have her rare 
courage come from to publicly and directly deny the accused CCP membership? She 
has other alternatives available to her at that moment before such an accusation. For 
example, against the cruel discursive reality of her being “stigmatized” as a CCP 
member, she could simply pay no attention to Trish Regan’s statement that she was a 
CCP member. Or she could instead, as she had always claimed so, see and use the 
opportune time to “lay out the facts” of CCP’s numerous good deeds done to her 
people since the reform and opening up, and briefly tell these “Chinese Stories” in a 
reasonable way to “win over the foreign audience” [her interlocutor and Fox 
audiences] to CCP’s side, and then expressed her great regret she had actually not 
been a CCP member. Was this not a double-win for her at that moment in the senses 
that she not only offered an effective counterargument and defended CCP’s reputation 
before American eyes? Was this not a good opportunity to win hundreds of millions of 
domestic audiences to her side, though she was said to be already one of China’s best 
known faces? So when we look back at this event to reconstruct and evaluate both 
sides’ arguments, Liu’s politeness and honesty style is not something that could be 
easily accounted for, while Trish Regan’s style of aggressiveness (in the way she 
raised all those tough questions) is obviously consistent with the previous “Trish style” 
in her show series. 
Therefore the style of honesty and politeness does not come from Liu Xin’s 
innermost self, and there is no such inner self of hers. Rather the honest self of Liu 
Xin is her ethos as a journalist. This also represents her work ethic of honesty and 
rationality. Most importantly, this work ethic has proved to be an effective principle, 
and is not inconsistent with her persona as “a symbol of Chinese toughness and 
rationality” on her talk show on CGTN. This is because being tough and rational 
before her Foreign or domestic viewers who live in China appear to be the 
embodiment of honesty in the rise of narrow nationalism.7 Hence the “Liu Xin” as a 
critic of Western media, for instance. However there might be another interpretation 
as well. This bigger and more recent context of the live discussion could be an 
extension of her family context of numerous multicultural experiences. As she 
recalled in her interview with Thepaper.com in 2017, feeling frustrated with moments 
 
7 With regard to the increased scrutiny, regulated operations and limited exposure in North America, Europe and 
the rest of world (Peter 2018), the major audience for CGTN, so to speak, are chiefly foreigners living or working 
in China, or Chinese English language learners, who are not necessarily its targeted audience though. 
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when her German husband and their kids complained about her praising China again 
upon hearing her version of China Story (Shih 2019), there were successful moments 
and failure ones as well during her 10 years’ efforts of this kind. Thus, for her, the best 
workable style is the honesty and politeness style or what she calls “lay-the-fact and 
speak-with-reason” style. But this is aimed at winning over the foreign audience. 
Audience consideration is the most important dimension here. 
Now the honesty and politeness style, out of thorough consideration, could work 
as a conceptual bridge between China and the U.S. Liu Xin managed neither to incur 
a curse from each side, nor to impose a blessing on each side. This was proved to be 
her best strategy in the debate. As was commented, her exposure there on Fox 
Business Network was itself a hard-earned credit not just for her employer CGTN but 
also for herself (Shih 2019). She was honest and polite in her opening remarks to 
express her gratitude to her host anchor for what she called “a great opportunity, 
unprecedented.” It has been a long-cherished tradition for Chinese to express their 
heartfelt gratitude to persons concerned for whatever goodness done to them. Liu Xin 
must have thought there should be no exception for her. Therefore, “thank-you” 
slipped out of her mouth twice in a straight low, followed by her redundant remarks 
that she had never “dreamed” that she “would have this kind of opportunity to speak 
to [her] and to speak to many audiences in ordinary households in the United States.” 
These remarks could be believed to be honest ones, but there could still be another 
interpretation: they could be meant to be ironical since Liu was already a household 
name in China simultaneously enjoying a certain degree of international fame, good 
or bad. Perhaps for some audiences, she should not have been so grateful. But 
whether all this was meant to be honest gratitude or ironical comments, Liu’s 
intention could be one mode of interpretation. The audience’s affection could be 
another. 
Apparently, Liu’s intention was to call all those “blanket statements” and “broad 
generalizations” into question (Tangen 2019). But while doing so, she had to partake 
in the discussion in the name of “only speaking for myself, as Liu Xin, a journalist 
working for CGTN,” in denial of the CCP membership, and in a polite way. As for the 
representational style, she mentioned specifically the styles of clarity, brevity, 
appropriateness and honesty. On recalling her performances in the discussion, she said: 
“I tried my best to make myself clear, to make my sentences short, to reach out to her, 
to answer Trish’s questions in an honest measure.” Stakes are high for the honesty 
style, since it is “the only way we can move forward.” She insisted on the necessity of 
being honest in verbal communication, and this also explains why she “didn’t go in 
with a confrontational mood.” Trudy Govier in her The Philosophy of Argument 
entertained the possibility of arguing “in nonconfrontational ways” (1999, p.55). She 
suggested there that we could “present arguments to offer reasons and evidence, with 
due respect for those whom we are addressing, and consideration for their beliefs and 
values” (p.55). Here, in the Chinese cultural context, the honesty style originates from 
the kernel of ancient Chinese rhetorical theories, i.e. the principle of “Rhetoric 
Establishes Sincerity” [修辞立其诚/xiū cí lì qí chéng] from Chinese cultural classic 
The Book of Changes, which means that rhetoric comes into play only if one’s 
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discourse sounds sincere or honest, and only in this way can one outstand him/herself 
in the social world.8 It is also here in this classic book that the two Chinese characters 
[修/xiū, meaning “to adjust or modify”] and [辞/cí, meaning “speech,” “discourse” 
or “words”] are juxtaposed together to make a phrase [修辞/xiū cí], which is rendered 
into the English language as “rhetoric,” though there is no perfect equivalence 
involved here in this rendering. This principle of Chinese rhetoric sheds some light on 
the importance of style in persuasive discourse. The rhetoricity of discourse is 
contingent, to some degree, upon the nature of the voice conveyed in the discourse. 
Seen this way, it is understandable that Liu’s adoption of the honesty or politeness 
style is out of a series of considerations behind the scenes. In preparing for this event, 
she defined the nature of the live discussion as “not a conversation between two 
countries or two people[s], and not even between Fox and CGTN,” but “a 
conversation between me and Trish, as journalists, as human beings, as if she wants, 
women.” Apparently, she was trying to deinstitutionalize her identity and dissolve it 
into a simple human being of blood and flesh. Only in this way could she dispense 
with all kinds of noises, bias, prejudice, institutional constraints, or pre-concepts. 
However, warns Catherine Hundleby, “Politeness institutionalizes rather than 
moderates certain aggressive tendencies in argumentation, creating gendered power 
strata in discourse, and preventing metaphors of war and aggression from losing their 
confrontational implications” (2013, p.242). In supposing an idealized context 
through the sincerity or politeness style, Liu Xin was also trying to intervene in the 
discursive reality in the audience’s mental horizon, or at least to drive a stake or 
wedge in the conceptual space. This of course constituted a huge challenge for her 
even if she had already become a well-established journalist with exceptional 
multilingual ability. However, notwithstanding having consciously “put herself in a 
disadvantageous situation” in that she had “agreed to be on Trish’s turf,” she 
explained that she “wanted to change Trish’s perception of Chinese people,” “change 
her perception of Chinese women, and possibly of Chinese people.” All in all, she 
wanted to make present the new collective ethos of Chinese women who are “willing 
to talk to [American women],” “not afraid,” and are “not hiding away from the 
problems that we face.”  
To be sure, this was quite successful. And the style of honesty or sincerity seemed 
to be the only available pathway to persuasion in this case. But she had to sacrifice 
something in order to make present her ethos of being an honest and sincere public 
figure before American audiences’ eyes. In the words of hers, she had to “put myself 
in her hands” and “let Trish call the shots about the time and place of the debate and 
nature of questions, which…were not communicated to her prior to the show,” except 
for a couple of keywords. In a word, Trish named almost everything of this debate, 
and Liu seemed to be a downright passive participant, in the words of 19th century 
Romanticist poet William Wordsworth, “the solitary reaper” in the discursive field, 
and this image of solitude could have reaped some sympathy from the American 
 
8 This principle of Chinese rhetoric, ever since its coinage during the Western Zhou (1046-771 BCE) dynasty, has 
been subjected to interpretations over the historical times of approximately 3,000 years, which in many cases clash 
with one another. The translation term here is taken from Google.com, but the interpretation is mine. 
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audience if she would have managed to leave an impression that whatever word she 
uttered on that occasion was coming out of her mouth in exactly the same way as 
leaves were falling down from trees naturally in the fall, as had been suggested in the 
Romanticist stance of anti-rhetoric. 
In this sense, Liu seemed to be more than a “polished debater” as claimed by 
Western media, and not at all her self-claimed “poor debater.” A true debater is 
probably someone who does not look like one, but who has the capacity to wield 
one’s sword into the very most fatal area. Liu Xin, to my mind, proved herself to be a 
stellar debater of such kind. She had lived up to her reputation as an internationally 
champion debater in 1996 on the British soil. Her sophistication as a debater 
manifests itself in the following words: “But if you really truly want to engage with 
someone, you go there disarmed. You go there and you don’t become defensive. You 
open your heart, and you open your mind and you talk. And that’s why I had to talk 
from my personal perspective, because then I have greater freedom to express what I 
really feel. And that was exactly what I did.”9 Liu’s words suggest, being honest or 
sincere does not necessarily mean being weak or deferential. The audience is never 
completely passive in verbal communication or argumentative exchanges. Rather it 
was precisely the projection of the ethotic honesty or sincerity that paved the way for 
Liu to enter into the conceptual space and take issue with Trish’s blanket statements 
and broad generalizations. More importantly, it was precisely the Liu Xin style of 
being honest, gentle, and sincere that put so much pressure on Trish’s aggressive style 
that she had to tone down her aggressiveness, especially when she was enjoying some 
advantage as the de facto host anchor. 
As a well-trained or even genius debater, when she finally managed to appear in 
the social space which abounded in deep disagreements hidden in Trish’s six 
questions. These deep disagreements include trade talks, IP theft, China’s developing 
nation status, tariffs, state capitalism, Chinese economic system. Each deep 
disagreement originates from the fundamental clashes between the two countries, and 
there is no easy answer for each one of them. In the case of intellectual property rights, 
indeed one of the biggest issues between the two countries, for example, Trish pointed 
out an agreed-upon consensus between both sides that “it is never right to take 
something that’s not yours.” Then she cited quite some cases from WTO, DOJ and 
FBI as what she called evidences to support her accusation that “China has stolen 
enormous amounts of” and “hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth” of “intellectual 
property.” Then there came her question about how American companies could 
operate in China if they were at risk for having their property, their ideas and their 
hard work stolen. Trish’s style remained as direct and aggressive as usual. Liu did not 
take aim at this style, but instead demonstrated her usual style of being calm, sincere, 
and forceful. She was calm in that she did not hurl harsh criticism back at her 
interlocutor’s accusation. Instead, she endeavored to construct a bright and promising 
reality that was different from the risky one cloaked in darkness. There in Liu’s 
 
9 The source of this section is from “Behind the scenes: How does Liu Xin see the unprecedented debate on Fox?” 
(https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d674e316b544f34457a6333566d54/index.html) 
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version of reality, the majority of American companies were profitable and were 
willing to come back to invest more and explore the Chinese market. This was indeed 
the bigger picture. But now this bigger picture might be disrupted by the Trump 
administration’s tariff policy. It was the new tariffs that could make companies and 
consumers from both sides suffer. This suffering was incurred not by IP theft, but by 
unilateralism of the U.S. side.  
Liu’s being sincere could be manifested in her public acknowledgement that IP 
theft is a common practice in every part of the world. Her point was that since this 
was a universal problem, it was unfair for only Chinese people and Chinese 
companies to be singled out and be stigmatized as thieves. But she did not take this as 
justification for acts of IP theft for some persons and some companies in China. She 
was interpreted as “not talking about China, but about all human beings” (Tangen 
2019). Here apparently she tried to expose the ridiculous logic inherent in Trish’s 
overgeneralization. To her, “blanket statements” of this kind were not helpful at all. 
As was pointed out in her counterstatement, against the popular belief that intellectual 
stealing was rampant there, there had been “a consensus because without the 
protection of IP rights, nobody, no country, no individual can be stronger, can develop 
itself. I think that is a very clear consensus among Chinese society.” But even though 
such a consensus is in place, there remains much room for improvement, to be sure. 
The forcefulness of her counterargument was further demonstrated in her point that 
there should have been a distinction between (paid) learning and theft. If one pays for 
whatever knowledge one learns, this should not constitute theft. Since the U.S. 
remains the technologically most advanced country in the world, international 
students have been and are still flooding into universities and academic institutions 
there from all over the world. They pay tuitions, and get educated. Is this not paid 
learning? Then when they return to their homelands to serve for people there, they 
become thieves all of sudden? Liu’s central point was that it was very hard to draw the 
dividing line since we human beings had prospered through mutual learning, and 
cooperation. 
Liu’s penetration of Regan’s logical soundness and her style of honesty in doing 
so had won credits for her counterarguments in the live discussion not only from her 
interlocutor on the occasion but also from some post-debate commentators. Tom 
Fowdy (2019), a British political and international relations analyst, argued in his 
commentary that “Liu gives us the bigger picture.” Contrary to anticipation that this 
debate would be a “heated and contentious encounter,” it turned out to be “in fact 
thoughtful, fair and pleasant to watch.” To his surprise, Liu demonstrated a style of 
confidence and calmness in challenging those overriding assumptions of the other 
side. Both sides cooperatively presented a “positive, civil and constructive” 
conversation in clarifying each side’s position. Similarly, Einar Tangen in his 
commentary defined the live discussion as “a nice debate, having two people actually 
talk to one another for a change, rather than making just broad generalizations.” He 
pointed it out for Trish that it was not right to make blanket statements or stereotypes 
about other countries and other people. He reminded Trish that she was not talking to 
“a monolithic body [CCP],” but “a very nice lady who was going to explain very 
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reasonably what China is about, and how she viewed all of these events.” (Tangen 
2019; emphasis added) Liu’s style of reasonableness was recognized. But how could 
we know whether Liu had succeeded in changing her audience’s perception of China? 
To what degree? By what standard? Questions remain as we move forward along this 
path of style. 
 
5. Conclusion 
None of these questions has an easy answer, and we cannot expect deep 
disagreements, blanket statements, overriding assumptions to disappear over a debate. 
The resurgence of interest in style as a dimension in contemporary studies of 
argumentation captures its negligence by scholars in this field in the past decades. 
However in the field of rhetoric studies, style has always been recognized as an 
important component. From Aristotelian notion of style in his Rhetoric, to Ciceronian 
five canons of rhetoric (invention, arrangement, style, memory, delivery), from the 
specialized study on style resulting from what Paul Ricoeur called “the death of 
rhetoric,” to the present-day notion of style as a stylistic device for strategic 
maneuvering in argumentation (van Eemeren 2019), studies on style are always there. 
But these studies are not without problems. For one, the significance of style has been 
downplayed by rhetoricians almost unanimously. For another, the traditional 
sequential order of a rhetorical process is also problematic. In many cases, style 
precedes the very progression of argumentation. Seen this way, style must be part of 
invention, and it proves itself to be an effective weapon in penetrating social spaces 
which abound in deep disagreements. Style is of no less importance than argument per 
se. There is no way for style to be separated from argument. Style is, in many cases, 
the very argument itself. The issue over the appropriateness of style in a cross-cultural 
argumentative context also calls our attention to its relevance to the position of an 
arguer. The position of an arguer decides not only the content of an argument, but also 
the way an argument is presented, i.e. the style of an argument, as is shown in the 
above discussions. 
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